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Article 7

Notes
Evidence-The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
Applied to Medical Records
In Fries v. Goldsby,' decided in December 1956, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held, inter aia, that a chiropractor's permanent
record of plaintiff's history, examination, diagnosis, care, and
treatment were not admissible into evidence under the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act.2 Because the court treated the
chiropractor as an expert in his field, this holding probably applies to other medical witnesses who testify as experts in their
fields of knowledge. Thus, the court has seemingly held that the
permanent records of physicians, surgeons, and dentists do not fall
within the purview of the Uniform Act. This note is a discussion
of that holding.
Plaintiff's automobile collided with defendant's truck on July
20, 1953. On August 7, 1953, the plaintiff consulted a licensed
chiropractor who had been practicing his profession in Nebraska
for thirty years. He took X-ray pictures of plaintiff's spine, diagnosed her injuries, and prescribed care and treatment. He also
gave plaintiff chiropractic adjustments at intervals until September 1954. At the trial he testified by deposition as a witness for
the plaintiff upon the stipulation that he might testify from records
and notes which were a permanent part of his records in plaintiff's case. However, upon defendant's objections, the trial court
refused to admit the witness's testimony regarding the history
given to him by plaintiff, his findings of plaintiff's condition, and
1 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956).
2 Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 25-12,108 (Reissue 1956). "The term 'business' shall
include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation
of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
"25-12,109. A record of an act, condition, or event, shall, insofar as
relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made
in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method,
and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
"25-12,110. Sections 25-12,108 to 12,111 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it.
"25-12,111. Sections 25-12,108 to 25-12,111 may be cited as the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act."

NOTES
his interpretaton of the X-ray pictures he had taken of the plaintiff. The trial court also refused to admit the X-ray pictures even
though a proper foundation had been laid as to the taking of
them. Finally, the trial court refused to admit the chiropractor's
permanent records.
On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a chiropractor is competent to testify as an expert witness in the field of
chiropractics and held that all of the evidence except the chiropractor's records should have been admitted. With regard to those
records the court said:
... Higgins v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 159 Neb. 549,
68 N.W.2d 170, is controlling here. Plaintiff's contention has no
merit. The chiropractor testified as a witness. As such it is elementary that he had a right to refresh his memory from his own records
and notes and to appropriately testify at length with regard to
plaintiff's history, examination, diagnosis, and treatment, together
with an interpretation of the X-rays taken by him, which were
admissible in evidence. Viewed in such light, his record and notes
would ordinarily be only cumulative evidence. 3
Thus, the court based its holding on two grounds: (1) that
the records would "ordinarily be only cumulative," and (2) that
Higgins v. Loup River Public Power District is controlling. On the
first of these points the court said, in effect, "if the chiropractor
had been allowed to testify from his records, those records would
have been cumulative and, therefore, inadmissible." However, the
chiropractor was not allowed to testify. This makes it difficult
to see why those records were cumulative at this stage of the
action. The court could have limited itself to indicating that such
records may be cumulative, and, as such, admissible only in the
discretion of the trial court. This result would have been in accord
with the court's prior treatment of cumulative evidence.4 Other
jurisdictions have reached a similar result.5
The second point, that Higgins v. Loup River Public Power
District is controlling, requires an examination of that case. In a
condemnation action to acquire an easement for a transmission
line, Higgins alleged that the Power District had not made a good
faith effort to contact him and to enter negotiations on the price
he should receive for the easement. On this issue the Power Dis-

163 Neb. at 438, 80 N.W.2d at 179.
O'Dell v. Goodsell, 152 Neb. 290, 41 N.W.2d 123 (1950); Horky v. Schroll,
148 Neb. 96, 26 N.W.2d 396 (1947).
5Moore v. State Finance Co., 202 Ore. 265, 274 P.2d 559 (1954); Veatch v.
State, 221 Ark. 44, 251 S.W.2d 1015 (1952); Croll v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1952).
3
4
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trict offered a document which had been prepared by the head
of its right-of-way department. The document recited that he
went to the Higgins home, that he attemped to contact Mr. Higgins,
that he talked with Mrs. Higgins, that she expressed dissatisfaction
with publicity the Higgins had received in connection with the
case, that she denied that she had told him previously that "her
husband would positively not allow anyone on the premises and
if anyone should attempt to do so, he would be immediately shot,"
and that Mrs. Higgins would not talk to him further. The trial
court admitted the document, but the Supreme Court reversed.
Relying heavily on Palmer v. Hoffman,6 the court held that the
document was not made "in the regular course" of the business of
the Power District because it was made solely for the purpose of
litigation.
It is difficult to see why the Higgins case should be controlling
here. Plaintiff consulted the chiropractor eighteen days after the
accident. He diagnosed her injuries and prescribed care and treatment for them. He also prescribed a brace which plaintiff obtained and wore to support her back. 7 Thus, it appears that the
records were made pursuant to consultations for the purpose of
care and treatment,8 not for the purpose of litigation., Certainly
the court would not contend that chiropractors (or other medical
men) keep records only because they may be of use in patients'
litigation.'0
0318 U.S. 109 (1943). This is the only United States Supreme Court.case
decided under the Federal counterpart of the Uniform Act. It held that a
railroad employee's accident report which was made pursuant to an established routine of the railroad company was not made "in the regular
course" of the railroad business within the meaning of the act.
7 163 Neb. at 434, 80 N.W. 2d at 177.
8 At 163 Neb. 436, 80 N.W.2d 178, the court approves the rule that, "The
opinion of a physician or surgeon as to the condition of an injured or diseased person is not rendered incompetent by the fact that it is based upon
the history of the case given by the patient to the physician or surgeon
on his examination of the patient, when the examination was made for the
purpose of the treatment and cure of the patient." (Emphasis supplied.) It
would appear that the circumstantial probability of their trustworthiness
would warrant the application of this rule to the experts' records. See 5
Wigmore, Evidence § 1422; and compare 3 Wigmore § 688 with 6 Wigmore § 1721.
9 For a case admitting doctor's records prepared for use in the controversy,
see Ellis v. State Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 285 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.
1956). Distinguish, Curtis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 363 Mo. 779, 253 S.W.2d
789 (1952) admitting a doctor's report of a pre-employment examination.
10 Cf. language in Higgins v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 159 Neb. 549,
557, 68 N.W.2d 170, 175 (1955).

NOTES
We do not mean to indicate that the theory behind the Higgins
case" cannot be applied to medical records. Instead, our criticism
is that in the principal case there is no indication that these particular records were made with a view to litigation. Furthermore,
it should be emphasized that some medical records may be excluded on other grounds. For example, they should not be admitted
over the patient's objection when they contain privileged information. 12 Nor should they be admitted unless the "custodian or other
qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation.'

13

In addition, it must be remembered that while the purpose of
the act was to obviate the necessity, expense, inconvenience, and
sometimes the impossibility of calling the persons who collaborated
to make the patient's record, 14 the act was not intended to open the
door to the avoidance of cross-examination. 5 Thus, to be admissible
the patient's record must have been made in the regular course of
business, 16 and must not contain information which is not germane
to the diagnosis or treatment.'7 Therefore, records which contain
statements like "Hold for police' 8 or "Diagnosis: (1) prob. criminal
abortion"' 9 are inadmissible. Closer cases arise when the medical
record contains a statement of the cause of the injury as related to
the doctor by the patient and the proponent argues that this is something that the doctor needed to know in order to properly care for
11 See also Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Owens v. Seattle, 299
P.2d 560 (Wash. 1956).
12 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1206 (Reissue 1956); O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 142
Neb. 706, 7 N.W.2d 647 (1943); Cf. Willis v. Order of Railroad Telegraphers,
139 Neb. 46, 296 N.W. 443 (1941).
13Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-12,109, supra note 2; Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 363 Mo. 864, 254 S.W.2d 577 (1953); State v. Phillips, 90 Ohio
App. 44, 103 N.E.2d 14 (1951).
14 Cantrill v. American Mail Line, 42 Wash.2d 590, 257 P.2d 179, 189 (1953).
15 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C.Cir. 1945); similar
prior opinion disapproved in Buckminster's Estate v. Commissioner, 147

F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944).

16 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. O'Neill, 211 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1954); McGuire v.
Corn, 92 Ohio App. 445, 110 N.E.2d 809 (1952).

17 Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955).
18Flemming v. Thorson, 231 Minn. 343, 43 N.W.2d 225 (1950).
19 People v. Terrell, 138 Cal.App.2d 35, 291 P.2d 155, 169 (1956).
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the patient. 20 The Minnesota Supreme Court answered such an argument, saying, "... It may well be that a doctor might desire to know
many things, but that fact alone does not make statements which are
otherwise inadmissible admissible by the simple expedient of including them in hospital records. We can see no reason why such inadmissible statements may not be eliminated from the hospital records
and the admissible portion permitted to go to the jury."21 Similar
questions may be presented when the medical record contains a
22
diagnosis, particularly if it is a diagnosis of a mental condition.
Because many of these complex problems can be properly
solved only by reference to the particular medical record in issue,
some courts vest the problem in the discretion of the trial judge and
apply the usual rule that he will not be reversed unless there
23
has been a manifest abuse of that discretion.
In conclusion it should be noted that although several of the
cited cases exclude particular medical records, no case has been
found to hold that medical records per se are inadmissible. It is
submitted that Nebraska should follow that lead and rule that
doctors' office records fall within the purview of the Uniform Act.
Such a ruling would not "open the door to the avoidance of crossexamination" because the admission of particular records could
be controlled case by case.
Howard E. Tracy, '57

2

0 See Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 5 Terry 283, 58 A.2d 689 (Superior
Ct. Del. 1948), where defendant offered a hospital record which contained a
statement that plaintiff had injured his ankle while walking along the
street. A doctor testified that it was necessary for him to know how the
injury occurred in order to properly treat it. The court admitted the
statement on the ground that it was "pathologically germane" to the injury.
21 Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688, 696 (1954).
The suggestion that the inadmissible portion must be separated was repeated
in Zuber v. Northern Pacific Ry., 246 Minn. 157, 74 N.W.2d 641 (1956). See
also State v. Meyer, 226 P.2d 204 (Wash. 1951).
22 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, supra note 15, at 306: "... There is
no magic in the word diagnosis which makes everything which can be
included in that term admissible. Some diagnoses are a matter of observation, others are a matter of judgment, still others a matter of pure conjecture. The admissibility of such diagnoses must depend upon their character."
For a discussion of the various types of hospital records the courts may be
asked to accept see Polasky and Paulson, Business Entries, 4 Utah L. Rev.
327, 349f (1955).
23 Cantrill v. American Mail Line, supra note 14; Choate v. Robertson, 195
P.2d 630 (Wash. 1948); York v. Daniels, 241 Mo. App. 809, 259 S.W.2d 109
(1953).

